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INTELLECTUAL COHERENCE IN AN 
EVIDENCE CODE 
Paul F. Rothstein* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
·The Federal Rules of Evidence (Federal Rules or Rules) were 
created in large part to promote uniformity and predictability in fed-
eral trials by providing a relatively instructive guide for judges and 
lawyers concerning the admissibility of evidence. As with any codifi-
cation, success in this respect requires, among other things, that there 
be a considerable degree of intellectual coherence among the code's 
various provisions. The Federal Rules fall short of intellectual coher-
ence in a number of areas. They contain contradictory and inconsis-
tent mandates that do not make theoretical sense and therefore 
accord the trial judge almost unHmited discretion in these areas. He 
or she may arbitrarily make a ruling based on either side of the con-
tradiction. Rulings are thus unlikely to be uniform or predictable on 
these matters.1 
Although the Federal Rules lack intellectual coherence in a 
number of respects, this Essay focuses on only two examples:2 (1) 
Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b ), which governs the admissibility of 
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University. Fonner chair, American Bar Associa-
tion, Criminal Justice Section Committee on Rules of Evidence and Criminal Procedure; 
fonner chair, Association of American Law Schools, Evidence Section; advisor on scien-
tific evidence, National Academy of Sciences, and Federal Judicial Center; consultant on 
the drafting of the Federal Rules of Evidence, United States House and Senate Judiciary 
Committees; and author of several books and approximately 100 articles. An earlier ver-
sion of this Essay was presented at the Evidence Section Program, Association of Ameri-
can Law Schools Annual Meeting, New Orleans, Louisiana, January 7, 1995. 
1. This is not to say that the Federal Rules did not make great strides forward in many 
areas, and are not on the whole quite successful and a considerable advance over the previ-
ous system. But other improvements are possible. 
2. I have commented on certain "intellectual incoherencies" in both Rule 404(b) and 
Rule 901 on earlier occasions. 
During my tenure as chairperson of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Committee 
of the American Bar Association's Criminal Justice Section, the committee examined Rule 
404(b) and made some excellent suggestions in connection with that rule that would have 
helped with the problem noted here. Professor David Leonard chaired the working group 
that produced these suggestions. See ABA Comm. on Rules of Criminal Procedure and 
Evidence, Federal Rules of Evidence: A Fresh Review and Evaluation, 120 F.R.D. 299, 322-
35 (1987). 
1259 
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prior crimes, wrongs, and acts to help establish a current alleged one;3 
and (2) Federal Rule of Evidence 901, which involves authentication 
and identification of documents and other items in order to establish 
the genuineness of their connection to the litigated matter.4 
II. RuLE 404(b ): OTHER CRIMES, WRoNGs, AND Acrs 
It is inescapable that the first sentence of Rule 404(b ),5 the pro-
hibitory sentence, is inconsistent with the second sentence, the permis-
sive sentence,6 at least as those sentences are currently interpreted. 
The first sentence commands, in effect, "Thou shalt not use other 
crimes, wrongs, or acts to prove character in order to prove an act in 
conformity with that character." The second sentence, however, says, 
in effect, "Yes, but you may use those other crimes, wrongs, or acts in 
order to prove such facts as knowledge, intent, motive, identity, plan, 
or absence of mistake or accident." .The standard interpretation of 
these two sentences is that evidence is excluded by the first sentence if 
it is offered on a "propensity" theory-that is, that the defendant's 
prior acts demonstrate a tendency to behave the same way in the fu-
ture. But, under the second sentence, the evidence may be admissible 
if the relevance of the evidence does not depend on a propensity in-
ference. This dichotomy does not hold up under closer examination. 
The first and second sentences cannot be construed consistently in 
light of their interpretation in case law. Both describe evidence of-
fered on a propensity theory. 
1\vo cases epitomize how the second, permissive sentence is ap-
plied. The old English "Brides of the Bath"7 case is certainly one of 
the primordial cases defining this category. In this case, the defendant 
was accused of drowning several of his wives in the bathtub,8 a 
number of whom were wealthy and left the defendant their money. 
3. FED. R. EVID. 404(b ). 
4. FED. R. EVID. 901. 
5. The first sentence of Ruie 404(b) reads as follows: "Evidence of other crimes, 
wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action 
in conformity therewith." FED. R. EVID. 404(b). 
I d. 
6. The second sentence of Rule 404(b) reads as follows: 
It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, op· 
portunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or 
accident, provided that upon request by the accused, the prosecution in a criminal 
case shall provide reasonable notice in advance of trial, or during trial if the court 
excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown, of the general nature of any such 
evidence it intends to introduce at trial. 
7. Rex v. Smith, 114 L.T.R. 239 (Crim. App. 1915). 
8. /d. at 262. 
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"Oh, what a terrible accident" the defendant probably said when the 
authorities were investigating the latest drowning. The authorities 
were prepared to believe the man's lamentations until they learned 
about the other dead wives. At trial the judge allowed evidence of the 
other deaths to help prove the current charges.9 The court admitted 
the evidence pursuant to something akin to what is now the second 
sentence of Ru1e 404(b ), using catch words like plan, intent, knowl-
edge, and absence of mistake or accident.10 
The second case is Jones v. State,U also known as the "Body Rub" 
case. In that case a woman was charged with theft after she made 
sexual advances to a man by rubbing her body against his in order to 
distract him while she stole his wallet.12 At trial the prosecution called 
several witnesses who testified that the defendant had previously done 
the same thing to them in the same mannerP The evidence was ad-
mitted to help prove the charge stemming from the latest incident.14 
As in Brides of the Bath, the court admitted the evidence pursuant to 
many of the same catch words that are now incorporated into the sec-
ond sentence of Rule 404(b ).15 
Plainly, the evidence in both cases was admitted on a propensity 
theory. In the first case the defendant had a propensity to drown his 
wealthy wives in the bathtub, perhaps in order to inherit their for-
tunes. In the second case the defendant had a propensity to rub bod-
ies and make sexual overtures in order to steal the wallets of her 
victims. Each defendant, therefore, was more likely to be guilty on 
the present occasion. It is inescapable that a propensity theory was 
used in the Brides of the Bath and Body Rub cases, but this is incon-
sistent with the first sentence of Rul~ 404(b) which appears to prohibit 
such a theory.16 
9. Id. at 264. 
10. Id. (holding evidence was admissible to prove "design"). 
11. 376 S.W.2d 842 (Tex. Crim. App. 1964). 
12. Id. at 842-43. 
13. Id. at 843. 
14. ld. 
15. Id. (including "identity, intent, motive, malice or common plan or scheme"). 
16. This confusion, I believe, is responsible for the huge amount of litigation in the area 
of Rule 404(b). Many of the conflicting decisions are detailed in PAUL F. RoTHSTEIN, 
FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE: RuLES OF EVIDENCE FOR THE UNITED STATES CoURTS 
AND MAGISTRATES, Rule 404(b) (2d ed. 1994) and PAUL F. RoTHSTEIN, EviDENCE: 
CASES, MATERIAlS AND PROBLEMS§ 4.02 (1986). The situation is summarized in PAUL F. 
ROTHSTEIN, EVIDENCE IN A NUTSHELL: STATE AND FEDERAL RULES, ch. 8 (2d ed. 1981). 
See also United States v. Himelwright, 42 F.3d 777,781-87 (3d Cir. 1994) (implicitly recog-
nizing problem); United States v. Sampson, 980 F.2d 883, 886 (3d Cir. 1992) (recognizing 
that character evidence is often offered for improper purposes under guise of Rule 404(b) ); 
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Several notions have been advanced to reconcile the apparent in-
consistency between these two sentences. A number of writersP fol-
lowing in the footsteps of recent English cases18 and Wigmore, 19 
suggest that the doctrine of chances affords a solution. They believe 
the doctrine provides a way to infer guilt from the multiplicity of of-
fenses in cases like Brides of the Bath and Body Rub without relying 
on the propensity reasoning that the first sentence prohibits. In other 
words the doctrine provides a function for the second sentence that is 
truly different from that of the first. 
The doctrine of chances asks a question that supposedly recon-
ciles the dilemma. It asks, "What are the chances that an innocent 
person would be charged falsely so many times?" If the answer is 
"rarely," as it would be in Brides of the Bath and Body Rub,20 it is 
safe to infer that the person is not innocent. It would be too coinci-
dental that an innocent defendant would be charged falsely so many 
times. It is, therefore, possible to arrive at the inference of probable 
guilt without using the prohibited propensity chain of reasoning-or 
so it is argued. 
The essence of this probable guilt argument is that there is a dis-
parity between the chances, or probability, that an innocent person 
would be charged so many times and the chances, or probability, that 
a guilty person would be charged so many times. If there is such a 
United States v. Beasley, 809 F.2d 1273, 1278 (7th Cir. 1987) (allowing judge to admit all 
evidence of prior similar crimes produces "gravest risk of offending the central prohibition 
of Rule 404(b)"). For recent cases searching for a rationale to admit evidence under Rule 
404(b), see United States v. Sutton, 41 F.3d 1257, 1259 (8th Cir. 1994), petition for cert. 
filed, (Mar. 6, 1995) (No. 94-8309); United States v. Bastanipour, 41 F.3d 1178, 1183 (7th 
Cir. 1994); United States v. Thtiven, 40 F.3d 1, 4-6 (1st Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 131 L. Ed. 
2d 243 (1995); United States v. Birch, 39 F.3d 1089, 1093-94 (10th Cir. 1994); United States 
v. Madden, 38 F.3d 747,751-53 (4th Cir. 1994); United States v. Jemal, 26 F.3d 1267, 1269 
(3d Cir. 1994); United States v. Jenkins, 7 F.3d 803, 807 (8th Cir. 1993); United States v. 
Miranda, 986 F.2d 1283, 1285 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. a. 2393 (1993); United States 
v. Templeman, 965 F.2d 617, 619 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 482 (1992). I wish to 
thank student Julie Brusslan for helping me wade through the mass of Rule 404(b) cases. 
A number of these cases seem to produce results or make statements that are exactly the 
opposite of others. 
17. See, e.g., Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Evolution of the Use of the Doctrine of 
Chances as Theory of Admissibility for Similar Fact Evidence, 22 ANGLO-AM. L. REv. 73 
(1993). 
18. See, e.g., R. v. P., 3 All E.R. 337 (H.L. 1991). 
19. See 2 JoHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT CoMMON LAW § 302 (James H. 
Chadbourn revisor, 1979); Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Dispute over the Doctrine of 
Chances, CRIM. JuST., Fall 1992, at 16, 19. 
20. The question posed by the doctrine implies that the answer would almost always be 
"rarely." 
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disparity, however, it is only because a guilty person would have the 
propensity to repeat the crime. If it were not for the propensity to 
repeat, the chances, or the probability, that an innocent person and a 
guilty person would be charged repeatedly would be identical. Hence, 
the argument hinges on propensity and runs afoul of the first sentence 
. of Rule 404(b ). The effort to reconcile the permission in the Rule 
with the prohibition in the Rule has failed. 
Furthermore, the doctrine of .chances does not answer any of the 
hard questions raised by Rule 404(b ). For example, how many other 
crimes are needed and how similar must they be, including their mo-
dus operandi, to the present crime? The number and similarity of the 
crimes greatly affect the degree of the disparity between the 
probability that an innocent person, in comparison to a guilty one, 
would be charged repeatedly. If the previous act is very different 
from the present act, it is quite possible that an innocent person, as 
well as a guilty person, might have been charged with both. 
The doctrine of chances leaves open the question of how unlikely 
it has to be that an innocent person would have been charged. Where 
do we draw the line? When do crimes become numerous and similar 
enough to the present crime that they cross over from inadmissibility 
to admissibility? This is the central problem in the "other crimes, 
wrongs, and acts" area that the doctrine of chances does not address. 
The doctrine says that the evidence is admissible if it is unlikely that 
an innocent person would be falsely charged so many times, but how 
unlikely does it have to be? 
In the movie Casablanca,21 the police, having heard a crime had 
been committed, respond with the classic expression, "Round up the 
usual suspects." As in real life, a person who has been charged before 
commonly is charged again any time a vaguely similar crime is re-
ported. Thus, contrary to the doctrine of chances, it is not so unlikely 
that an innocent person would be repeatedly charged falsely. 
Furthermore, by admitting evidence on the theory that it is un-
likely that an innocent person would have been charged before, the 
doctrine of chances encourages the police, judges, and juries to make 
the assumption that the person must be guilty if he or she has been 
charged previously. By asking the question, "How likely is it that an 
innocent person would be charged so many times," the doctrine sug-
gests that if the police charged someone, he or she is probably guilty. 
The doctrine sends a harmful message to the police, judges, and juries. 
21. CASABLANCA (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1942). 
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Contrary to the constitutional presumption of innocence, it invites 
judge and jury to conclude that if a person has been charged, that 
person is most probably guilty. In other words, police, judges, and 
juries are licensed to do exactly what Rule 404(b) was designed to 
prevent-assume guilt from previous charges. This is the foundation 
of the doctrine. For these reasons, the doctrine of chances does not 
provide a satisfactory way to reconcile the apparent internal inconsis-
tency in Rule 404(b ). · 
This Essay proposes a more promising way to produce intellec-
tual coherence between the two sentences of Rule 404(b ). My tenta-
tive suggestion, admittedly somewhat incomplete, is the following. 
There are many different kinds of propensity. There are propen-
sities that are amorphous, diffuse, and tinged with moral approbation 
or disapprobation, which we call character. For example, a person 
who has cheated on an income tax return might have a non-law-abid-
ing character. However, this has only the weakest tendency to suggest 
that that person, as compared with a totally law-abiding person, might 
assault someone. Yet, it carries the burden of possible moral preju-
dice against the non-law-abiding person. The propensity is general 
and laden with moral value-exactly what a lay person means by 
"character." A lawless person, a violent person, a dishonest person, 
and a thieving person are all descriptions of the propensity we call 
character. 
Another type of propensity is specific propensity. This is the pro-
pensity to do a certain thing in a certain way repeatedly. It may even 
be called a plan, pattern, or scheme. The word "plan" here would be 
used in the sense that these acts all proceed according to the same 
blueprint, not necessarily that they have been planned together at the 
same time. 
Examples of specific propensities would be the propensity to rub 
bodies to steal wallets or the propensity to drown wealthy spouses in 
the bathtub in order to inherit. This is not the propensity we would 
call character. No one would say that a person has the character to 
drown wealthy spouses in the bathtub in order to inherit or that a 
person has the character to rub bodies and make sexual overtures in 
order to steal wallets. These propensities are too specific in that they 
are addressed to the manner or means of carrying out the offense. 
One would likely feel comfortable, however, saying that a person has 
the "specific propensity" to do these things. While the general pro-
pensity called character has a moral tinge to it, other general propen-
sities do not, and the more specific propensity may or may not. In the 
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examples mentioned above, the specific propensity does have a moral 
tinge.22 
On the even more specific end of the propensity spectrum lies 
"habit." Habit is earmarked by relative-not necessarily complete-
invariability and involuntariness. It is not necessarily morally tinged, 
as is character. Habit is comprised of conduct very specifically like the 
conduct in issue, and is marked by numerous instances of the conduct 
that occur virtually whenever the same stimuli are presented. 
Viewed in this way, the first sentence of 404(b) bans propensity, 
but only when it is the general and morally tinged propensity known 
as character. In other words, character, the word used and banned'in 
the first sentence of the Ru1e, is not synonymous with "propensity." 
Instead, character is just one type of propensity-the amorphous, gen-
eral, morally-tinged kind-that presents the specter of the several 
dangers the character ru1e worries about: that the propensity is too 
amorphous and general to lead to a solid inference of specific behav-
ior; that the jury may not realize this; and that they might be induced 
to make prejudicial moral judgments of the person or relax the rigor 
of their scrutiny of the facts based on their willingness to punish for 
general or past "badness." 
The second sentence, the permissive sentence of Ru1e 404(b ), 
licenses another kind of propensity. This is not character, which is 
excluded, but the more specific kind of propensity that may not be 
attended by the same dangers in the same degree. Finally, there is 
habit, governed by Ru1e 406, which licenses an even more specific and 
compelling kind of propensity-one that rises to such a level that we 
can call it habit.23 
TIL AUTHENTICATION AND IDENTIFICATION 
The second intellectual incoherence in the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence involves authentication and identification under Ru1e 901. The 
22. Thus, the specific propensity evidence mentioned in the examples lacks one of the 
negative aspects of character evidence, namely, the-perhaps disguised-probative weak-
ness of character evidence due to its generality. Yet the specific propensity has the other 
negative aspect of character evidence-the moral tinge. But it is not character evidence, 
subject to Rule 404(b); it is only subject to Rule 403, under which its prejudicial nature can 
be individually appraised in comparison to its probative value. 
23. Yet another type of propensity might be a documented clinical psychological ill-
ness, predilection, or personality trait as testified to by a properly qualified expert. The law 
is unclear regarding this point. 
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Rules perpetuate an error fostered by Wigmore,24 an error that ap-
pears in the structure of the Rules, in the advisory committee notes to 
Rule 90125 and Rule 104,26 and in the cases.27 The error is the 
dogma-accepted now as "the law"-that the authentication and 
identification requirement is just an aspect of relevancy. In other 
words certain tangible evidence, such as a knife or document, is not 
relevant unless a special quantum of evidence-known as "authenti-
cation" or "identification"-connecting the items with the litigated 
matter is introduced as a foundational matter. 
Under the traditional Wigmore doctrine, a knife, for example, 
would have to be shown to be the knife used in the crime that is the 
subject of the triaF8 Similarly, the signature "Paul Rothstein" on a 
document would have to be shown to be genuine, if who signed the 
document was important to the case. It is not enough, under the Wig-
more doctrine of authentication, that the signature purports to be my 
signature. There needs to be an additional quantum of evidence that 
the signature is genuine before the document is admissible, and this 
additional quantum requirement is said to be a requirement of rele-
vancy. The additional quantum would be, for example, testimony that 
someone recognizes the handwriting, that someone witnessed the 
signing, or that the signatUre has distinctive characteristics such as the 
little smiley faces that I may customarily put in the dots over the i. 
The accepted belief, thanks to Wigmore and others, is that this kind of 
authentication or identification is a necessity inherent in the notion of 
relevance. It is this belief that is fundamentally wrong and causes seri-
ous problems. 
Take the signature, for example. Certainly, it is slightly more 
probable that it is Paul Rothstein's signature if it says "Paul Roth-
stein" than if it says "John Jones." Relevance, defined in Rule 401, 
only requires the slightest increase in probability for evidence to be 
relevant.29 
24. 7 JoHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2129 (James H. 
Chadbourn revisor, 1978). 
25. FED. R. EVID. 901 advisory committee's note. 
26. FED. R. EVID. 104 advisory committee's note. 
27. See, e.g., United States v. Espinoza, 641 F.2d 153,169-70 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 
u.s. 841 (1981). 
28. All references to the knife case herein assume a prosecution for stabbing with a 
knife. 
29. " 'Relevant evidence' means evidence having any tendency to make the existence 
of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less 
probable than it would be without the evidence." FED. R. EVID. 401. 
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Whether or not the knife found in the defendant's possession and 
offered into evidence was the same one used in the crime, the offered 
knife is still relevant under Rule 401 as long as there is any possibility 
that it was the knife used in the crime. Any such possibility produces 
at least a tiny advance in proving guilt. Consequently, the knife is 
relevant under Rule 401. In fact, even if there is no possibility the 
knife was the same knife used in the crime, the offered knife is still 
relevant in that it shows some degree of interest in knives or some 
knowledge of knives on the part of the defendant. This in turn ad-
vances the possibility of guilt in some slight degree, as compared with 
a situation where this evidence of interest or knowledge is absent. 
The system may want to exclude the document signed by Paul 
Rothstein or the knife found in the defendant's possession on a 
ground other than relevance if the document or knife is not more con-
nected to the litigated event than the minimal connection posited 
here. The system might want to keep these items out, not on the 
grounds of relevancy, but because of considerations like those codified 
in Federal Rule 403:30 The jury may exaggerate the probative force of 
a document or knife that is so minimally connected to the case. The 
possibility of prejudicing the defendant or misleading the jury may 
outweigh the item's slim degree of relevancy.31 But it is important to 
realize on what basis the computation must be made and what the 
judge is supposed to consider. It is a Rule 403 computation.32 
Although it is difficult to document the causes of the confusion in 
the cases, decisions in this area are largely devoid of a consistent and 
coherent rationale.33 This deficiency seems, at least in part, attributa-
ble to the error in thinking that I have outlined. 
30. "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the 
jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumu-
lative evidence." FED. R. Evm. 403. 
31. There may be other ways to get in the legitimate force of the evidence without this 
undesirable baggage. For example, telling the jury that a knife was found in the defend-
ant's possession. Rule 403, however, might exclude the knife itself on a number of bases. 
32. See supra note 30. 
33. For examples of cases illustrating this inconsistency, see United States v. Neal, 36 
F.3d 1190, 1210 (1st Cir. 1994); United States v. Johnson, 28 F.3d 1487, 1498 (8th Cir. 1994), 
cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 768 (1995); MDU Resources Group v. W.R. Grace & Co., 14 F.3d 
1274, 1281-82 & n.12 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. a. 89 (1994); United States v. Espi-
noza, 641 F.2d 153, 170-71 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 841 (1981); United States v. 
Brown, 603 F.2d 1022, 1027-29 (1st Cir. 1979); United States v. Wilson, 532 F.2d 641, 644-
45 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 846 (1976). 
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Perhaps Wigmore can be forgiven for indulging in this error be-
cause his definition of relevancy required more than the slight in-
crease in probability required by the Federal Rules. Wigmore's 
definition of "legal relevance" included consideration of factors like 
those in Rule 403.34 Under the Federal Rule of Evidence, however, 
there is little excuse for this error. 
This error in thinking has led to·· an incongruence between Rule 
901(a) and 901(b ), both of which govern the quantum of proof needed 
as a foundation for the authentication and identification of evidence. 
Rule 901(a) states a general principle that there is sufficient authenti-
cation or identification of an item if there i~ enough evidence to sup-
port the conclusion of some reasonable person that the item was 
authentic or identified.35 Rule 901(b) supposedly illustrates applica-
tions of the general rule of 901(a). However, subsection (b) actually 
incorporates previous case law articulating more rigid requirements,36 
and seems to require more than subsection (a). In its many examples 
of how to authenticate or identify various items, and in its advisory 
committee notes and the cases cited therein, Rule 901(b) plainly sug-
gests that more is required than the minimum that might satisfy a rea-
sonable person.37 
Surely, in the signature example, even without any proof that the 
signature is Paul Rothstein's, some reasonable person might feel there 
is enough to form a conclusion that this is Paul Rothstein's signature 
under Rule 901(a). The quantum of proof in 901(b), however, is 
something more than merely. the signature. For example, someone 
34. 1A JoHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT CoMMON LAW § 28, at 969 (Peter 
Tillers revisor, 1983). Wigmore writes: 
/d. 
The judge, in his efforts to prevent the jury from being satisfied by matters of 
slight value, capable of being exaggerated by prejudice and hasty reasoning, has 
constantly seen fit to exclude matter that does not rise to a clearly sufficient de-
gree of value. In other words, legal relevancy denotes, first of all, something 
more than a minimum of -probative value. Each single piece of evidence must 
have a plus value. 
35. Rule 901(a) states: "The requirement of authentication or identification as a condi-
tion precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that 
the matter in question is what its proponent claims." FED. R. Evm. 901(a); see also Neal, 
36 F.3d at 1210 (finding that there was reasonable probability that evidence was what it 
was purported to be); MDU Resources Group, 14 F.3d at 1281-82 (recognizing principle 
via Rule 104 without mentioning Rule 901); cf. Johnson, 28 F.3d at 1498 (finding that ade-
quate foundation was established). 
36. See FED. R. EVID. 901(b) advisory committee's note. 
37. Rule 901(b) states: 
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who knows Paul Rothstein's signature has to be able to identify it,38 
the jury must compare an authenticated sample,39 there must be dis-
tinctive characteristics to the signature40 or distinctive characteristics 
reflected in the document,41 or it must be validated by a handwriting 
expert.42 A similar situation exists with the knife example.43 
Thus, subsection (a) and subsection (b) send contradictory 
messages. Subsection (a) requires a low quantum of proof such as 
would satisfy a reasonable person in the conduct of normal affairs. In 
(b) Illustrations. By way of illustration only, and not by way of limitation, the 
following are examples of authentication or identification conforming with the 
requirements of this rule: 
(1) Testimony of witness with knowledge. Testimony that a matter is what it 
is claimed to be. 
(2) Nonexpert opinion on handwriting. Nonexpert opinion as to the genu-
ineness of handwriting, based upon familiarity not acquired for purposes of the 
litigation. 
(3) Comparison by trier or expert witness. Comparison by the trier of fact 
or by expert witnesses with specimens which have been authenticated. 
( 4) Distinctive characteristics and the like. Appearance, contents, substance, 
internal patterns, or other distinctive characteristics, taken in conjunction with 
circumstances. 
(5) Voice identification. Identification of a voice, whether heard firsthand or 
through mechanical or electronic transmission or recording, by opinion based 
upon hearing the voice at any time under circumstances connecting it with the 
alleged speaker. 
(6) Telephone conversations. Telephone conversations, by evidence that a 
call was made to the number assigned at the time by the telephone company to a 
particular person or business, if (A) in the case of a person, circumstances, includ-
ing self-identification, show the person answering to be the one called, or (B) in 
the case of a business, the call was made to a place of business and the conversa-
tion related to business reasonably transacted over the teleplione. 
(7) Public records or reports. Evidence that a writing authorized by law to 
be recorded or filed and in fact recorded or filed in a public office, or a purported 
public record, report, statement, or data compilation, in any form, is from the 
public office where items of this nature are kept. 
(8) Ancient documents or data compilation. Evidence that a document or 
data compilation, in any form, (A) is in such condition as to create no suspicion 
concerning its authenticity, (B) was in a place where it, if authentic, would likely 
be, and (C) has been in existence 20 years or more at the time it is offered. 
(9) Process or system. Evidence describing a process or system used to pro-
duce a result and showing that the process or system produces an accurate result. 
(10) Methods provided by statute or rule. Any method of authentication or 
identification provided by Act of Congress or by other rules prescribed by the 
Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority. 
FED. R. EVID. 901(b). 
38. FED. R. EviD. 901(b)(1), (2). 
39. FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(3). 
40. FED. R. Ev10. 901(b)(4). 
41. Id. 
42. FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(3). 
43. Rules 901(a) and (b) refer to "identification," which is generally taken to refer to 
the foundation needed for tangible items other than writings. "Authentication" is the term 
used in the case of writings. 
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contrast, subsection (b) requires a higher quantum of proof than that 
of a reasonable person. Judges subject to these two contradictory 
mandates may do anything that they want. And they do.44 
These contradicting mandates can make a difference. Consider, 
for example, a case in which an item or an unsigned document is 
found in a dresser drawer of a party's bedroom. Seemingly, under the 
standard of subsection (a)-the reasonable person standard-one 
might be justified in concluding that this item or document belonged 
to or was written by the party. The inference is not airtight but should 
be enough to admit the evidence and allow it to be debated before the 
jury. Some reasonable person could conclude that the item or docu-
ment probably belongs to or was written by the party. Subsection (b), 
however, suggests that something more is required for admissibility 
than what an ordinary reasonable person would require. The mere 
fact that an item was in the party's dresser drawer might not be 
enough to authenticate or identify it45 under the implication of subsec-
tion (b). Thus, a judge may decide either way. The conflict that exists 
in the authentication cases reflects judges' confusion about exactly 
what standard they are supposed to apply, and the confusion is not 
entirely their fault.46 
IV. CoNCLUSION 
Incoherence concerning the admissibility of prior conduct and in-
coherence surrounding authentication and identification represent 
only two of a number of similar problems in the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence, a generally admirable but far from perfect evidence code. 
Rather than being worked out by the courts, these incoherencies, 
which largely go unrecognized, have produced some pernicious results 
in the cases and have magnified the amount of litigation in several 
areas. 
44. See supra note 33. 
45. Remember, by "authenticate" or "identify," the Jaw means only that the evidence 
must meet a threshold that makes it admissible before the jurors, who then may or may not 
find the item to be authentic or identified with the matter in controversy in accord with 
their function as weighers of evidence: 
46. See supra note 33. One solution to the dilemma would be to consider subsection 
(a) as applying only to un·anticipated cases not specifically envisioned by subsection (b). 
The dresser drawer example might then be within (a) and not (b). But then there is a real 
theoretical problem of another kind: Why should some cases be governed by a higher 
standard than others just because they have been foreseen? 
